

International Reserves and Central Bank Independence*

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Abstract

This paper explores the role of central bank independence on the accumulation of international reserves. Using panel data for 11 Latin American countries, I document that more independent central banks tend to accumulate more reserves. I use this fact to depart from the assumption of a consolidated government in a quantitative sovereign default model. Instead, I consider two government entities: a central bank who can save in a risk-free foreign asset and a fiscal authority who issues debt and lacks commitment. I show that, if the fiscal authority is more impatient than the central bank, in equilibrium, the conflict of interest between government entities rationalizes positive levels of reserves and debt. I find that accumulating reserves has the benefit of disciplining over-borrowing by the fiscal authority. A key insight is that the fiscal authority can issue more debt for any level of reserves but chooses not to because it would increase sovereign spreads, making it more costly to borrow. The model accounts for 83% of the average level of reserves observed in Mexico from 1994 to 2017. I find that having an independent central bank increases social welfare by 0.1%. Welfare gains come from reducing over-borrowing by 3.3% of GDP. Finally, I provide a rule for reserve accumulation that mimics the optimal behavior of an independent central bank. (*JEL* E58, F32, F34, F41)

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1 Introduction

Emerging market economies (EMEs) hold large amounts of international reserves and public debt. This is a puzzling behavior because economies facing default risk pay high interest rates on their liabilities and receive low interest rates on their assets.¹ Why does a government prefer to hold reserves instead of paying back public debt? What is the welfare effect of accumulating reserves? Moreover, what is an adequate level of international reserves for EMEs? Although there is a large and growing literature that addresses these questions, all previous studies on the accumulation of reserves ignore the interaction between central bank and fiscal authority by assuming either exogenous fiscal policy or a consolidated government choosing reserves and debt. In practice, international reserves are often held by the central bank, public debt is issued by the fiscal authority, and government entities may have different incentives driving their choices. Specially, if the central bank is independent from the government. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that explores the role of central bank independence (CBI) on the accumulation of international reserves.

This paper studies the joint accumulation of international reserves and public debt in a sovereign default model ([Eaton and Gersovitz \(1981\)](#); [Aguiar and Gopinath \(2006\)](#); [Arellano \(2008\)](#)) with two government entities: a central bank who can save in a risk-free foreign asset (i.e. reserves) and a fiscal authority who can issue one-period debt and lacks commitment. I introduce CBI into the model by assuming that the central bank discounts the future at the same rate as households (i.e. benevolent central bank), while the fiscal authority has a higher degree of impatience (i.e. impatient fiscal authority).² This assumption, which is meant to capture the idea that independent central banks can be isolated from political pressures, leads to a disagreement among government entities about households' intertemporal consumption. I show that, in equilibrium, the conflict of interest between the central bank and fiscal authority rationalizes simultaneously positive levels of reserves and debt.³

¹[Rodrik \(2006\)](#) estimate that EMEs incur annually in an average GDP loss of 1% by maintaining portfolios with high levels of reserves and debt.

²Sovereign default models usually assume a consolidated government with a high degree of impatience to account for political economy aspects in EMEs. See [Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath \(2009\)](#). While this is a reasonable assumption for the fiscal authority because it depends directly on the central government, it may not be accurate for a central bank who is independent from the central government. Following [Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini \(1991\)](#) and [Walsh \(2003\)](#), I assume that central banks are isolated from political economy aspects through their independence.

³In an important early work, [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#) found that canonical sovereign default models with one-period debt cannot rationalize simultaneously positive levels of reserves and debt.

In the quantitative analysis, I find that accumulating reserves has the benefit of disciplining over-borrowing by fiscal authority. Thus, in equilibrium, it is optimal for an independent central bank to hold large amounts of reserves. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico, a typical emerging economy with an independent central bank that is a common reference for studies on reserve accumulation. I discipline the central bank's discount factor by matching the domestic money market interest rate, and the fiscal authority's discount factor is calibrated internally by targeting total public debt.⁴ The model accounts for 83% of the average level of reserves observed in Mexico from 1994 to 2017. In the model simulations, I find that in periods of high income and low spreads the fiscal authority borrows more and the central bank accumulates more reserves. I show that this pattern accounts for a high and positive correlation between reserves and debt as well as the pro-cyclical behavior of reserves observed in the data.

In a quantitative exercise, I contrast the two-government-entities approach with an economy where the central bank is as impatient as the fiscal authority (i.e. consolidated government). I show that, in accordance with [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#), a canonical sovereign default model cannot rationalize simultaneously positive levels of debt and reserves. By comparing the results from the two-government-entities approach with those from the consolidated government economy under the benchmark calibration, I quantify the welfare gains of having an independent central bank that accumulates reserves to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing. By accumulating reserves by 7.2% of GDP, the net debt position decreases by 3.3% of GDP and social welfare increases by 0.1%. Welfare gains come from reducing the borrowing cost implied by sovereign spreads and mitigating the distortion in intertemporal consumption.

Finally, I use the model to evaluate the performance of rules for the accumulation of reserves.⁵ Moreover, I provide a simple and implementable rule that approximates the optimal behavior of an independent central bank. I find that a rule that is linear in debt and spreads delivers about x/y of the welfare gains achieved by following the optimal state contingent policy implied by the two-government-entities approach. Contrasting this rule with the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, a common metric for reserve adequacy, I show that the reserve accumulation rule implied by the two-government-entities approach delivers higher welfare.

⁴By following this calibration strategy, the model is able to match high levels of debt without implying an outrageous domestic interest rate as standard default models when assuming a low discount factor.

⁵Work in progress.

Mechanism.—In the model, the accumulation of reserves is driven by a conflict of interest between central bank and fiscal authority. The assumption of different discount factors among government entities implies a disagreement about households' intertemporal consumption. On one hand, the impatient fiscal authority would prefer to front-load consumption and issue more debt than what is socially optimal. On the other hand, the benevolent central bank would prefer to smooth consumption and reduce the net debt position of the economy. Therefore, accumulating reserves has the benefit of undoing fiscal authority's over-borrowing and mitigating distortions in intertemporal consumption. Conversely, the fiscal authority could undo the effects of reserve accumulation by issuing more debt for any level of reserves. Why, then, would the central bank choose to hold positive levels of reserves? Consider a portfolio where the economy is holding zero reserves. For any foreign bond bought by the central bank, the fiscal authority could issue one domestic bond to undo the effect of central bank's purchases on the net debt position. However, the fiscal authority's cost of undoing purchases by the central bank is increasing in the level of reserves because portfolios with higher levels of reserves and debt imply higher spreads. In a nutshell, the fiscal authority understands that it could undo the effect of reserve accumulation on the net debt position but chooses not to because higher spreads reduce the amount of consumption that can be front-loaded. Thus, the central bank's ability to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing depends on the level of spreads faced by the economy.

It is essential for the mechanism of the model to assume that after default lenders cannot seize the reserves held by the central bank. Otherwise, portfolios with higher levels of reserves and debt would not imply higher spreads. Thus, undoing central bank's purchases would be costless and the accumulation of reserves by the central bank would not have effect on the equilibrium consumption. To illustrate this point, suppose that after default the central bank cannot maintain control of its assets. This implies that accumulating reserves would increase the repayment value but not the default value, altering the incentives to default in the same way as debt. Thus, buying one foreign bond would decrease the probability of default in the same magnitude, but different direction, as increasing debt by one bond. Therefore, for any level of reserves the fiscal authority could issue debt to undo central bank's purchases without affecting the spread levels. In this case, the relevant statistic would be the net debt position and the two-government-entities approach would be equivalent to the environment in [Arellano \(2008\)](#).

In summary, there are two key assumptions for my results: (i) the conflict of interest between central bank and fiscal authority, and (ii) the central bank's capability to retain its reserves after default. Subsection 2.3 discusses anecdotal evidence that support these assumptions.

Related literature.—This paper contributes to the literature that studies the accumulation of international reserves, in particular the one studying the joint accumulation of reserves and debt in quantitative sovereign default models as in [Aguiar and Gopinath \(2006\)](#) and [Arellano \(2008\)](#).⁶

[Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#) was the first paper on this literature and is closely related to the two-government-entities approach presented in this paper. They show that a canonical sovereign default model cannot rationalize simultaneously positive levels of reserves and debt. This result holds because accumulating reserves is costly and a consolidated government can get the same net debt position by reducing debt instead of accumulating reserves. In their paper, the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role due to the one-period debt maturity. In contrast to [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#), this paper rationalizes positive levels of reserves and debt by introducing two government entities with a conflict of interest. In the two-government-entities approach, the benefit of accumulating reserves comes from the central bank's ability to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing and mitigate the distortion in intertemporal consumption. Quantitatively, I find that the conflict of interest between the central bank and fiscal authority accounts for the patterns of reserves observed in the data.

[Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#) rationalize positive levels of reserves and debt by adding long-term debt to a canonical sovereign default model. In their model, the consolidated government transfers resources from good times to bad times by accumulating reserves and long-term debt. Thus, the benefit of accumulating reserves is to provide a hedge against rollover risk. [Tavares \(2018\)](#) explores the role of international reserves in sovereign debt restructuring. In the model, the benefit of accumulating reserves is to improve lenders recovery rates after default, which implies a drop in sovereign spreads. [Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla \(2020\)](#) studies the accumulation of reserves in a sovereign default model with nominal rigidities under a fixed exchange rate. In their model, issuing debt to accumulate reserves allows the government to reduce the average and the volatility of unemployment in the future. Thus, the benefit of accumulating reserves is to provide

⁶See, for example, [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#), [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#), [Tavares \(2018\)](#), and [Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla \(2020\)](#).

macroeconomic stability. In contrast to these papers, the two-government-entities approach studies the joint accumulation of reserves and debt without assuming coordination between central bank and fiscal authority. Moreover, I contribute to the literature by providing a tractable model of sovereign default where there is a conflict of interest between the central bank and fiscal authority.⁷

A different strand of the literature analyzes the role of reserves implementing exchange rate policies. [Fanelli and Straub \(2018\)](#) develops a theory of foreign exchange interventions in a small open economy with limited capital mobility. They show that, in order to avoid excessive currency appreciation, the central bank accumulates reserves to lean against the wind of global capital flows. [Amador et al. \(2020\)](#) studies the problem of a central bank pursuing an exchange rate policy that it is inconsistent with the interest rate parity because of a binding zero lower bound constraint. They show that the resulting violation in interest rate parity generates an inflow of capital that the central bank needs to absorb by accumulating reserves. [Bocola and Lorenzoni \(2020\)](#) proposes a theory of financial crises, dollarization, and lending of last resort. In their model, the accumulation of reserves has the benefit of boosting the fiscal capacity of the government in the states of the world where a crisis takes place and the currency depreciates. In contrast to this literature, my paper abstracts from exchange rate considerations and studies the accumulation of reserves in an environment where there is no coordination between government entities. For instance, one could think that the conflict of interest among government entities comes from a disagreement between committing to a specific exchange rate policy or boosting the fiscal capacity of the government. The two-government-entities approach complements this literature by providing an unified framework to study the implementation of exchange rate policies in an environment where there is no coordination among government entities.

Other studies seeking to explain the demand for international reserves include the literature on the precautionary role of reserves. [Aizenman and Lee \(2007\)](#) studies the accumulation of reserves in an open economy version of [Diamond and Dybvig \(1983\)](#), generating endogenous sudden stops. [Caballero and Panageas \(2008\)](#) shows that there are significant gains from having financial instruments that provide insurance against sudden stops. [Jeanne and Ranciere \(2011\)](#) introduces reserves into the model as an Arrow-Debreu security that pays off in a sudden stop, and provides a simple

⁷An interesting avenue for future research is to explore all the motives for the accumulation of reserves presented above in the two-government-entities approach, and see how a specific benefit of accumulating reserves is affected by the lack of coordination between government entities.

analytical formula to quantify the optimal amount of reserves. [Hur and Kondo \(2016\)](#) sheds light on the upward trend in the reserves-to-debt ratio by studying the accumulation of international reserves in a multi-country model with endogenous sudden stops. [Arce, Bengui, and Bianchi \(2019\)](#) provides a theory of international reserves as macroprudential policy. They show that the government accumulates reserves to reduce the exposure to sudden stops due to private over-borrowing. This paper is closely related to the two-government-entities approach in the sense that the central bank accumulates reserves to mitigate the costs of over-borrowing. The two-government-entities approach complements this strand of the literature by studying the joint dynamics of reserves, debt, and sovereign spreads. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on the role of central bank independence on the accumulation of reserves.

Layout.—Section 2 documents that more independent central banks tend to accumulate more international reserves, and provides evidence that motivates the key assumptions of the model. Section 3 presents a canonical sovereign default model with an independent central bank. Section 4 presents a deterministic version of the model that illustrates the reserve accumulation motive in the two-government-entities approach. Section 5 describes the calibration and presents the quantitative results. Section 6 concludes.

2 Facts on Reserves and Central Bank Independence

This section presents empirical evidence regarding the interaction between reserves and central bank independence. Subsection 2.1 describes the data sources used. Subsection 2.2 documents that more independent central banks tend to accumulate more international reserves. 2.3 provides anecdotal evidence that supports the main mechanism of the model.

2.1 Data

I use annual data from 1970 to 2017 for a set of 30 emerging economies, which are commonly used in the literature.⁸ As it is common in studies of emerging economies, I exclude data for sovereign default episodes following Catao and Mano (2017).

For central bank independence, I use a *de jure* CBI index from Garriga (2016). Following Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), the index is based on sixteen criteria coded on a scale from 0 to 1 (lowest and highest independence, respectively) and reflects political independence, financial independence, and policy independence of the central bank from the government. For international reserves, I use data from the International Financial Statistics. As defined by the IMF (2001), reserves are "official public sector foreign assets that are readily available". This definition includes foreign currencies and foreign-currency deposits and securities, special drawing rights (SDRs), and the reserves position at the IMF. Following the standard convention, I exclude gold. For public debt, I use data from the IMF Historical Public Debt Database for the 1970-2012 period, and from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database for the 2012-2017 period. In line with my motivation, I consider all forms of defaultable public debt. This includes all maturities, and debt denominated in domestic and foreign currency as well as issued domestically or externally. For GDP, I use data from the World Development Indicators Database. For spreads, I use the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) for the 1994-2017 period. For inflation rates, I use data from the International Financial Statistics.

⁸The sample includes countries used in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) and Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2018) that are classified as emerging economies by the IMF's World Economic Outlook. The 30 countries in the panel are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

2.2 International Reserves and Central Bank Independence

Inspired by Rogoff's view of delegating monetary policy to a "conservative central banker", most emerging economies approved central bank independence reforms to insulate central banks from short-term political pressures and mitigate the inflation bias that may arise under discretionary policy.⁹ Figure 1 illustrates that the so-called inflation bias and the secular increase in central bank independence were especially relevant in European and Latin American countries. Panel (a) presents annual inflation rates by region, and shows that hyperinflation was a common phenomena in Europe and Latin America, but not in the Middle East and Emerging Asia. Panel (b) presents the trend of the mean CBI index by region, and shows that emerging economies have substantially increased the legal independence of their central banks.




Figure 1: Inflation and Central Bank Independence by Region

While the negative correlation between CBI and inflation is a well-established fact¹⁰, the effect of CBI on the accumulation of foreign assets held by central banks has not been studied. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that documents a positive correlation between central bank independence and the accumulation of international reserves. Figure 2 presents the

⁹See Rogoff (1985), Waller (1992), Walsh (1995), and Svensson (1997). Walsh (2003) emphasizes two key aspects of independence: insulation from politics when it comes to defining the objectives of monetary policy, and the independence to freely implement policy once those goals have been defined.

¹⁰See Alesina and Summers (1993), Walsh (2008) and Waller (2011). Although the correlation is a well-established fact, the evidence on causality is mixed.

evolution of the mean CBI index and the mean level of reserves. Panel (a) illustrates an intertwined relation between CBI and the level of reserves for all the emerging economies in the sample. I find that the accumulation of international reserves is highly and positively correlated with central bank independence ($\rho = 0.89$). Panel (b) shows the correlation of CBI and the level of reserves for the 11 Latin American countries in the sample ($\rho = 0.73$). Panel (c) illustrates that the intertwined relation between CBI and reserves also holds for the 8 European countries in the sample ($\rho = 0.95$). Panel (d) shows that in Asian and Middle Eastern countries the accumulation of reserves has increased more than proportional to the increase in CBI, which suggests that the accumulation of reserves may be driven by other factors. Appendix X presents a regression analysis by region to illustrate other factors that are correlated with the accumulation of reserves.




Figure 2: International Reserves and Central Bank Independence

Since the association between CBI and reserves could be driven by other confounding factors, I estimate the following panel fixed effect regression:

$$\log(A/y)_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 (CBI)_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \log(\hat{y})_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \log(B/y)_{i,t-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where α_i represents time invariant country fixed effects and γ_t denotes time fixed effects. The term $(A/y)_{i,t}$ denotes the level of reserves normalized by GDP for country i at time t . All explanatory variables are lagged one period to control for endogeneity. $(CBI)_{i,t}$ denotes the CBI index for country i at period t , $(\hat{y})_{i,t}$ is the cyclical component of GDP for country i at period t , and $(B/y)_{i,t}$ denotes the level of public debt normalized by GDP for country i at period t . The term $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ denotes the regression residuals. In the baseline specification, I include as regressors all the variables considered in the theoretical model except for sovereign spreads.¹¹

Table 1 reports results for the eleven Latin American countries in the sample. The regression analysis shows that, other things equal, the positive correlation between CBI and the accumulation of reserves is robust to various controls and specifications. This result holds for other regions except for Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Appendix X presents results for all the regions in the sample. The regression estimate β_1 can be interpreted as indicating that a one point increase in *de jure* CBI is associated with a β_1 percent increase in reserves. In specification (1), for example, an increase of 1 point in CBI is associated with a 2.36% increase in the level of reserves. As a reference, the CBI index in Mexico increased by 25 points following the CBI reform of 1993. Specification (4) controls by inflation rate, exchange rate regime, and sovereign spreads. The coefficient associated with the inflation rate is negative, which is consistent with previous studies such as [Alesina and Summers \(1993\)](#) and [Walsh \(2008\)](#). To control for exchange rate regime, I introduce a dummy variable that assigns "0" to countries with flexible exchange rates and "1" to countries with fixed exchange rates.¹² The coefficient associated with the exchange rate regime implies that countries with fixed exchange rates accumulate more reserves, which is consistent with [Bianchi and Sosa-Padilla \(2020\)](#). Finally, I include sovereign spreads as a control variable. The coefficient associated with spreads is negative, which is consistent with the model.

¹¹Data available for sovereign spreads starts in 1994, which implies that by considering this variable in the baseline regression I lose most of the observations from the pre-independence period.

¹²I use the fine classification codes from [Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff \(2017\)](#). I assign a "0" to those countries classified from "1" to "8" in IRR, and "1" to those countries classified from "9" to "14" in IRR.

In summary, this subsection documents that more independent central banks tend to accumulate more international reserves. In section 3, I present a canonical sovereign default model with an independent central bank that is consistent with this fact. Although the model abstracts from nominal variables, I introduce the so-called inflation bias by assuming an impatient fiscal authority. In contrast to the fiscal authority, I assume that independent central banks operate in institutional frameworks that isolate them from political pressures.

Table 1: Panel Regressions

	Dependent variable: $\log(A/y)$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CBI	2.36**	2.38**	2.37**	3.45**
	(0.96)	(0.92)	(0.90)	(0.94)
$\log(\hat{y})$	-0.95	-1.41**	-1.42**	-0.65**
	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.23)
$\log(B/y)$	-0.24	-0.18	-0.17	0.21
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.17)
inflation		-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.13**
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)
fx regime			0.05	0.35*
			(0.15)	(0.19)
spreads				-0.47**
				(0.16)
Number of countries	11	11	11	9
Observations	359	359	359	148
R^2	0.47	0.51	0.51	0.61

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

2.3 Supportive Anecdotal Evidence

This subsection provided anecdotal evidence that supports the key assumptions of the two-government-entities approach: (i) the conflict of interest between central bank and fiscal authority, and (ii) the central bank's capability to retain its reserves when the fiscal authority defaults.

Conflict of Interest.—The case of Argentina illustrates pretty well not only the conflict of interest among government entities but also the importance of having an institutional framework that insulate the central bank from political pressures. In 2010, the President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner announced a plan to use international reserves to pay back debt. However, the central bank president refused to support her plan. According to the *New York Times*, Mrs. Kirchner's cash-poor government is seeking to use \$6.5 billion of Argentina's nearly \$48 billion in central bank reserves to help cover \$13 billion in international debt... But after her central bank president, Martin Redrado, refused to support the plan, Mrs. Kirchner fired him by decree on Thursday. On day later a federal judge, Maria Jose Sarmiento, blocked Mrs. Kirchner's plan to tap the reserves and ordered Mr. Redrado reinstated, saying that only Congress could remove him."¹³ In the case of Mexico, politicians have also manifested an interest to use the reserves held by the central bank. For instance, in 2018 the Mexican congressman Benjamin Robles Montoya proposed to use the international reserves to finance public investment and anti-poverty programs.¹⁴

Reserves after Default.—Argentina is also a good example of the central bank's capability to retain its reserves when a default episode occurs. In 2015, the Argentinian central bank won the reversal of a U.S. court ruling that had allowed bondholders to try to hold it responsible for the debt defaulted in 2002. According to *Reuters*, "The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York overturned a 2013 ruling denying a bid by Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) to dismiss claims by U.S. investment firms holding \$2.4 billion in judgments against the South American country. U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa had previously held that the central bank had waived its sovereign immunity, and that as a result, the hedge funds could move forward with a lawsuit targeting the bank's assets."¹⁵ This case sets an international precedent and guarantees that vulture funds will not be allowed to seize the reserves of the central bank.

¹³Argentine President and Central Bank in Standoff, *New York Times*, January 10, 2010.

¹⁴Proponen utilizar reservas internacionales en inversion productiva, *El Sol de Mexico*, October 31, 2018.

¹⁵U.S. appeals court says bondholders cannot seize Argentina's reserves, *Reuters*, August 31, 2015.

3 Model

This section presents a dynamic small-open economy model in which households receive a stochastic endowment, the fiscal authority issues non-state-contingent defaultable debt, and the central bank buys a reserve asset that pays a risk-free interest rate.¹⁶

3.1 Environment

Endowments.—Time is discrete and indexed by $t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}$. The economy's endowment of the single tradable good is denoted by $y \in \mathfrak{R}_{++}$. The endowment process is given by

$$\log(y_t) = \rho \log(y_{t-1}) + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $|\rho| < 1$ and $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \eta^2)$.

Households.—The representative household has preferences given by

$$E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \right\}, \quad (1)$$

where E denotes the expectation operator conditional on information at time 0, β is the households' discount factor, and c is private consumption.¹⁷ The utility function $u : \mathfrak{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The households' budget constraint is given by

$$c_t = (1 - \tau^\pi)y_t + T_t, \quad (2)$$

where $T \in \mathfrak{R}$ denotes lump-sum transfers from the fiscal authority and $\tau^\pi \in \mathfrak{R}_{++}$ is an exogenous inflation tax collected by the central bank. I assume that the inflation tax is constant over time and sufficiently large to finance the accumulation of reserves.¹⁸

¹⁶This framework is similar to [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#) except for the consolidated government assumption.

¹⁷Following [Bocola, Bornstein, and Dovis \(2019\)](#), private consumption can be reinterpreted as public consumption.

¹⁸In the absence of a monetary framework, the central bank does not have any endogenous source of income to finance the accumulation of reserves. By allowing an exogenous inflation tax, I introduce a source of income for the monetary authority in the simplest way. Alternatively, I can assume fiscal support as most of the related literature implicitly does. However, in any case the resource constraint of the economy is the same and the results do not change substantially.

Two-Government-Entities.—The economy is populated by a fiscal authority and a central bank. Government entities maximize the same utility function as households but they differ in their discount factors. This assumption is meant to capture the idea that government entities may have different incentives driving their choices, specially if the central bank is independent from the government. Therefore, the objective function of government entity $j \in \{F, M\}$ is given by

$$E_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta^j)^t u(c_t) \right\},$$

where β^F and β^M denote discount factors of the fiscal authority and the central bank, respectively. In particular, we assume that the fiscal authority is more impatient relative to the households and the central bank has the same discount factor as households. This is, $\beta^F < \beta^M = \beta$.

This assumption, which is key for most results in this paper, is the main departure from the standard literature. Sovereign default models usually assume a consolidated government with a high degree of impatience to account for political economy aspects in emerging economies.¹⁹ While this is a reasonable assumption for the fiscal authority because it depends directly on the central government, this assumption may not be accurate for a central bank who is independent from the central government. Independent central banks, as discussed in section 2, operate in institutional frameworks that isolate them from these political economy aspects and that align the central banks' incentives with those of the household.²⁰

Central Bank's Budget Constraint.—The central bank uses seigniorage, $\tau^\pi y$, to buy a risk-free foreign asset, $A \in \mathfrak{R}_+$, that pays one unit of consumption good in the next period and is traded at a constant price q^* . We assume that τ^π is sufficiently large to finance the accumulation of reserves, and the central bank can also transfer resources to the fiscal authority, $\Omega \in \mathfrak{R}_{++}$.²¹ Therefore, the central bank's budget constraint is given by

$$q^* A_{t+1} + \Omega_t = \tau^\pi y_t + A_t, \tag{3}$$

¹⁹See Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2009)

²⁰On these two arguments see Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), and Walsh (2003).

²¹In practice, central banks transfer their surplus annually to the central government (In the case of the Mexican central bank, these funds are called "remanente de operaciones"). However, most central banks can also transfer resources indirectly by buying government bonds. In the model, I abstract from this distinction and consider any form of transfer from the central bank to the central government.

where A_t denotes the central bank's reserves holdings at the beginning of period t and A_{t+1} represent the level of reserves chosen by the central bank during period t .

Fiscal Authority's Budget Constraint.—The fiscal authority issues non-state contingent debt $B \in \mathfrak{X}_+$ at price q , which in equilibrium depends on the amount of debt issued, the new stock of reserves, and the exogenous shocks. As in canonical sovereign default models, debt contracts are not enforceable and the fiscal authority can choose to default at any time. The fiscal authority uses transfers from the central bank either to transfer resources to households or pay previous liabilities. Therefore, the fiscal authority's budget constraint is given by

$$T_t + B_t = q_t B_{t+1} + \Omega_t, \quad (4)$$

where B_t denotes liabilities at the beginning of period t and B_{t+1} represents the amount of bonds issued in period t .

Resource Constraint.—By consolidating the budget constraints of households and government entities (eq. 2, 3, and 4) we obtain a standard expression for the resource constraint

$$c_t = y_t - B_t + A_t + q_t B_{t+1} - q^* A_{t+1}. \quad (5)$$

Default.—When the fiscal authority defaults, I assume exclusion from financial markets with reentry probability $\theta \in (0, 1)$, an exogenous default cost, and zero recovery rate (i.e. the fraction of the loan that lenders recover after a default).²² I follow [Arellano \(2008\)](#) and [Chatterjee and Eyingungor \(2012\)](#) by capturing default costs (e.g. reputation costs, sanctions, and misallocation of resources) as an income loss $\phi(y)$, which is increasing in income. I follow [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#) and [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#) by assuming zero recovery rate.

As discussed in section 2, I also assume that after default lenders cannot seize the reserves and the central bank retains control of its reserves and still has access to financial markets. Even though this is a standard assumption in the literature and is consistent with observed default episodes, it is important to mention that is key for my results. Otherwise, the central bank cannot discipline over-borrowing by the fiscal authority and the relevant statistic would be the net debt as in [Arellano \(2008\)](#).

²²All these assumptions are common in the literature.

Therefore, the resource constraint during default is given by

$$c_t = y_t - \phi(y_t) + A_t - q^* A_{t+1}. \quad (6)$$

Foreign Lenders and Risk Premium Shock.—There is a continuum of identical foreign lenders of measure one. They have perfect information regarding the endowment process of the economy and can observe the level of income, debt, and reserves every period. We assume that foreign lenders price bond’s payoffs using a stochastic discount factor, m , given by

$$m_{t,t+1} = e^{-r^* - (\kappa_t \varepsilon_{t+1} + 0.5 \kappa_t^2 \eta^2)}, \quad (7)$$

where ε and η are the parameters governing the income process, r^* denotes the discount rate, and $\kappa_t \geq 0$ represents the risk premium shock. This specification of the lenders’ discount factor delivers a time-varying endogenous risk premium on sovereign bonds that captures disturbances to international financial markets that are exogenous to local conditions.²³

The risk premium shock follows a two-state Markov process with values $\kappa_L = 0$ and $\kappa_H > 0$, and transition probabilities π_L and π_H . In normal times, $\kappa_t = \kappa_L = 0$, lenders are risk neutral as in [Arellano \(2008\)](#). Otherwise, $\kappa_t = \kappa_H > 0$, lenders become risk averse and require a higher expected return to buy government bonds.²⁴ This shock plays an important role matching the distribution of spreads that we observe in the data, but it is not crucial for the core mechanism of reserves accumulation presented in this paper. Under the benchmark calibration, I abstract from the risk-premium shock to emphasize the conflict of interest among government entities as the main force for reserve accumulation in the two-government-entities approach. See subsection [5.2](#).

Conflict of Interest Between Government Entities.—In the model, the accumulation of reserves is driven by the assumption of two different government entities, which is a novel feature in sovereign default models that study the joint accumulation of reserves and debt. The difference in discount factors leads to a disagreement among government entities about households’ intertempo-

²³This specification of the lenders’ discount factor is a special case of the discrete-time version of the [Vasicek \(1977\)](#) one-factor model of the term structure, and it has been used in other sovereign default models such as [Arellano and Ramanarayanan \(2012\)](#), and [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#).

²⁴A higher value of κ_H can be seen as capturing the correlation between the small open economy’s GDP and the lenders’ income process, or alternatively, the degree of diversification of foreign lenders.

ral consumption. Since government entities have different policy instruments to affect the net debt position of the economy, defined as $N \equiv B - A$, this disagreement could be illustrated by rewriting the resource constraint (eq. 5) as follows

$$c_t = y_t - N_t + q_t B_{t+1} - q^* A_{t+1},$$

where the third term of the RHS, $q_t B_{t+1}$, illustrates that the impatient fiscal authority can front-load consumption by issuing debt, and the fourth term of the RHS, $q^* A_{t+1}$, shows that by accumulating reserves the central bank reduces consumption today to smooth future consumption. While the price of international bonds q^* is constant, the domestic bond price schedule q_t is a function of the government entities' choices because it depends on the endogenous probability of default. As in [Arellano \(2008\)](#), the bond price schedule is decreasing in debt because the new level of debt only affects negatively tomorrow's repayment value but not tomorrow's default value, which increases the probability of default and decreases the bond price schedule. In contrast, the new level of reserves affect both the repayment and default values. Subsection 5.4 shows that the central bank's ability to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing depends on the dynamics of the bond price schedule and reserves.

Timing.—The timing of actions within each period is as follows:

1. Shocks, $s_t = (y_t, \kappa_t)$ are realized, and the aggregate state of the economy is given by (s_t, B_t, A_t) .
2. The fiscal authority chooses whether or not to default, $D_t = \{0, 1\}$.
 - (a) If default occurs, $D_t = 1$, the fiscal authority is excluded from financial markets and the central bank chooses the new level of reserves, A_{t+1} .
 - (b) Otherwise, $D_t = 0$, government entities move simultaneously: the fiscal authority issues new debt, B_{t+1} , taking as given the bond price schedule, $q_t(s_t, B_{t+1}, A_{t+1})$, and the central bank chooses the new level of reserves, A_{t+1} .
3. Households consume, c_t .

3.2 Recursive Problem

We now describe the recursive problem of each agent in the economy. Since households simply consume their endowment after transfers, and lenders provide the amount of debt demanded by the fiscal authority, as long as the expected return on domestic bonds equals the return on the risk-free foreign asset, $\frac{1}{q^*}$, the only two strategic agents in the model are the government entities. Therefore, we can interpret this environment as a simultaneous game in which the fiscal authority makes default and debt choices in period t taking as given the central bank's strategy, and vice versa, the central bank chooses the new level of reserves at period t taking as given the fiscal authority's strategy. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, where government entities' strategies depend only on payoff-relevant-state variables. We drop time subscripts and move to the recursive formulation where x and x' , respectively, indicate current and future values of variable x .

Fiscal Authority.—Let $V^F(s, B, A)$ be the value function of the fiscal authority that faces the state (s, B, A) and has the option to default. Given a bond price schedule q , the function V^F satisfies the following functional equation:

$$V^F(s, B, A) = \max_D \left\{ (1 - D)V_r^F(s, B, A) + (D)V_d^F(s, A) \right\}, \quad (8)$$

where V_r^F denotes the fiscal authority's repayment value given by

$$V_r^F(s, B, A) = \max_{B'} \left\{ u(c) + \beta^F E[V^F(s', B', A') | s] \right\},$$

subject to

$$c = y + A - B - q^*A' + q(s, B', A')B',$$

$$A' = \hat{A}_r(s, B, A),$$

and V_d^F represents the fiscal authority's default value given by

$$V_d^F(s, A) = u(c) + \beta^F (\theta E[V^F(s', 0, A') | s] + (1 - \theta)E[V_d^F(s', A') | s]),$$

subject to

$$c = y - \phi(y) + A - q^* A'$$

$$A' = \hat{A}_d(s, A),$$

where $\hat{A}_r(s, B, A)$ and $\hat{A}_d(s, A)$ denote the central bank's decision rules for reserves accumulation in repayment and default states, respectively.

The solution to equation 8 yields decision rules for default, $\hat{D}(s, B, A)$, and debt issuance, $\hat{B}(s, B, A)$. The default rule is equal to 1 if the government defaults and is equal to 0 otherwise. In the recursive equilibrium, lenders use these decision rules, as well as the decision rules for reserves, to price debt contracts. The decision rules for reserves solve the central bank's recursive problems described below.

Central Bank.—The central bank's choice of reserves accumulation depends on whether the fiscal authority has access to financial markets. In repayment states, the central bank's value function V_r^M is given by

$$V_r^M(s, B, A) = \max_{A' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta^M E[(1 - D')V_r^M(s', B', A') + (D')V_d^M(s', A') | s] \right\}, \quad (9)$$

subject to

$$c = y + A - B - q^* A' + q(s, B', A')B',$$

$$B' = \hat{B}(s, B, A),$$

$$D' = \hat{D}(s', B', A'),$$

where $\hat{B}(s, B, A)$ denotes today's debt choice, $\hat{D}(s', B', A')$ represents tomorrow's default choice, and V_d^M is the central bank's value function in default states given by

$$V_d^M(s, A) = \max_{A' \geq 0} \left\{ u(c) + \beta^M (\theta E[V_r^M(s', 0, A') | s] + (1 - \theta) E[V_d^M(s', A') | s]) \right\}, \quad (10)$$

subject to

$$c = y - \phi(y) + A - q^* A'.$$

The solution to equation 9 yields a decision rule for reserves in repayment, $\hat{A}_r(s, B, A)$. The third and fourth lines of this equation illustrate that when the fiscal authority has access to financial markets, the central bank takes as given fiscal authority's strategy and households' consumption is determined by the interaction of both government entities. In contrast, equation 14 shows that when the fiscal authority is excluded from financial markets, households' consumption is exclusively determined by the central bank through its decision rule for reserves in default, $\hat{A}_d(s, A)$.

Bond Price Schedule.—Bond prices compensate lenders for their risk-adjusted opportunity cost:

$$q(s, B', A') = E[m(s, s')(1 - \hat{D}(s', B', A'))|s], \quad (11)$$

where bond prices depend not only on the debt issued but also on the new stock of reserves. Subsection 5.4 shows that the portfolio composition is relevant to determine the bond prices, and not only the net debt position of the economy. Finally, we use lenders' stochastic discount factor and their portfolio condition (eq. 7 and 11) to get an expression for the risk-free foreign bond price, given by

$$q^* = e^{-r^*}. \quad (12)$$

3.3 Recursive Equilibrium

A Markov perfect equilibrium for this economy is defined by (i) a set of value functions V^F , V_r^M , and V_d^M ; (ii) decision rules for default \hat{D} , borrowing \hat{B} , reserves in default \hat{A}_d , reserves in repayment \hat{A}_r , and consumption \hat{c} ; and (iii) a bond price function q such that:

1. Given q , policy functions $\{\hat{D}, \hat{B}\}$ solve the fiscal authority's problem (eq. 8).
2. Given q , policy function \hat{A}_r solves the central bank's problem in repayment (eq. 9).
3. \hat{A}_d policy function solves the central bank's problem in default (eq. 14).
4. Given government policies, policy function \hat{c} satisfies the resource constraint.
5. Given government policies, q satisfies the lender's no arbitrage condition (eq. 11).

4 Deterministic Case

In order to illustrate that the conflict of interest between government entities can rationalize positive levels of international reserves and public debt, I begin by considering a deterministic version of the model where endowments are known at period 0, $y_t = 1$ for all t , and there is no risk-premium shock, $\kappa_t = 0$ for all t . I also assume that the reentry probability is zero, $\theta = 0$, and the exogenous default cost is given by $\phi(y) = \gamma$, where $0 < \gamma < 1$. Therefore, the endowment after default is given by $y^{def} = (1 - \gamma)$.

In this environment, there is no default in equilibrium. Instead, there is an endogenous borrowing limit that represents the maximum level of debt such that the fiscal authority is willing to repay. Lenders know that for any level of debt above the borrowing limit, the fiscal authority's optimal choice is to default on its liabilities. Therefore, they will not lend more than this amount. In this section, I show that in debt-constrained economies where the fiscal authority issues more debt than what is socially optimal, an independent central bank accumulates reserves to discipline over-borrowing by fiscal authority.

Proposition 1 characterizes the borrowing limit. Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium for an economy populated by a consolidated government who is more impatient than households, which is equivalent to the deterministic version of [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#). Proposition 3 shows that the two-government-entities approach rationalizes positive levels of reserves and debt. Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal allocations of debt and reserves. Corollary 1 shows that, in the two-government-entities approach, the central bank can implement the optimal net debt position of the economy by accumulating reserves.

Proposition 1 (*Characterization of the borrowing limit*). *Let \bar{B} denote the borrowing limit.*

$$\text{If } \beta^M = \beta = q^* \text{ then } \bar{B} = \frac{\gamma}{1-q^*}.$$

Proof. See appendix.

Proposition 1 tells us that, under some assumptions, the borrowing limit does not depend on the level of reserves. This result follows from assuming that the central bank discounts the future at the same rate as households and the rest of the world. This assumption lets me characterize analytically the borrowing limit and illustrate in a simple way the main mechanism of the model. Appendix X studies the general case where the borrowing limit is a function of the level of reserves.

Proposition 2 (*Consolidated Government Equilibria*) Let B_t^{alf} and A_t^{alf} denote, respectively, debt and reserves levels in equilibrium. For any initial level of debt and reserves, B_0 and A_0 , $\exists \bar{t}$ such that if $\beta^F = \beta^M < \beta = q^*$ then $B_t^{alf} = \bar{B}$ and $A_t^{alf} = 0$ for all $t \geq \bar{t}$.

Proof. See appendix.

Proposition 2 tell us that a consolidated government does not accumulate reserves. This result, consistent with [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#), is driven by the relative impatience of the government. Since a consolidated government can get the same net debt position through different combinations of reserves and debt, when the borrowing constraint is binding an impatient government has no incentives to hold positive levels of reserves. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the portfolio of reserves and debt is undetermined. Figure 3 illustrates that an impatient government consumes the reserves, and borrows as much as possible. In this specific example, the government consume its reserves in the first period and borrows up to the borrowing limit in the next four periods. Even though it is possible to observe positive levels of reserves in the first four periods, a consolidated government eventually deplete the reserves due to its relative impatience.

Proposition 3 (*Two-Government-Entities Equilibria*) Let B_t^* and A_t^* denote, respectively, debt and reserves levels in equilibrium. For any initial level of debt and reserves, B_0 and A_0 , if $\beta^F < \beta^M = \beta = q^*$ then $B_t^* = \bar{B}$ and $A_t^* > 0$ for all $t > 0$.

Proof. See appendix.

Proposition 3 tell us that the two-government-entities approach rationalizes positive levels of reserves and debt. This result is driven by the assumption of different discount factors. This assumption leads to a conflict of interest between government entities. In particular, the fiscal authority prefers to front-load consumption and the central bank prefers to smooth consumption. Since government entities have different policy tools to affect the net debt position of the economy, the equilibrium in the two government entities approach is such that the fiscal authority borrows up to the borrowing limit and the central bank accumulates reserves to discipline over-borrowing by fiscal authority. Figure 4 illustrates that a benevolent central bank accumulates reserves as long as the impatient fiscal authority issues debt. Thus, the net debt position of the economy remains constant.

The conflict of interest, as well as the different policy tools that government entities have to affect the net debt position of the economy, leads to a simultaneous game where the fiscal authority uses debt markets to front-load consumption and the central bank accumulates reserves to undo fiscal authority's over-borrowing. Figure 5 illustrates government entities' best responses for a given initial levels of debt and reserves. While the central bank's best response is increasing in debt, the fiscal authority's best response is increasing in reserves. Therefore, in equilibrium the central bank accumulates reserves to push the fiscal authority to the borrowing limit and discipline fiscal authority's over-bowing. It is essential for my result that the economy is debt-constrained. Otherwise, the fiscal authority can undo the central bank's choice by issuing more debt for any level of reserves. Moreover, in the absence of a borrowing limit there is no equilibrium in the deterministic model. This is because for any level of reserves the fiscal authority can issue more debt, and vice versa, for any level of debt the central bank can accumulate more reserves.

While in the deterministic model the existence of a borrowing limit is guaranteed by assuming that fiscal authority lacks commitment and debt is defaultable, in the stochastic model there is no borrowing limit. However, these assumptions imply a spread on interest rates as in canonical sovereign default models. Subsection 5.4 shows that the fiscal authority could undo the central bank's choice of reserves, but does not want to because it does perceive that spreads are going up and this is costly.

Proposition 4 (*Social Planner Equilibria*) Let B_t^{SP} and A_t^{SP} denote, respectively, debt and reserves levels in equilibrium. For any initial levels of debt and reserves, B_0 and A_0 , if $\beta^F = \beta^M = \beta = q^*$ then $\forall B_t \in [B_0, \bar{B}] \exists A_t \geq 0$ such that:

1. $B_t^{SP} = B_t$,
2. $A_t^{SP} = A_t$,
3. $N_t^{SP} = B_t - A_t = B_0 - A_0$.

Proof. See appendix.

Corollary 1 (*Social Planner Equilibria*) Let B_t^{SP} and A_t^{SP} denote, respectively, debt and reserves levels in equilibrium. For any initial levels of debt and reserves, B_0 and A_0 , if $\beta^F = \beta^M = \beta = q^*$ then $\forall B_t \in [B_0, \bar{B}] \exists A_t \geq 0$ such that:

1. $B_t^{SP} = B_t$,
2. $A_t^{SP} = A_t$,
3. $N_t^{SP} = B_t - A_t = B_0 - A_0$.

Proof. See appendix.

Proposition 4 tell us that in the social planner economy (i.e. consolidated government who is as patient as the households) there is multiplicity of equilibria. However, the optimal net debt position is unique and equal to the initial net debt level. Appendix X discusses the existence of multiple equilibria in the two-government-entities approach.

Corollary 1 tell us that an independent central bank can implement the optimal net debt position by accumulating reserves. Figure 6 illustrates that, in equilibrium, the net debt position of the two-government-entities approach is equal to the optimal net debt position of the economy. This result is driven by the existence of an endogenous borrowing limit. Therefore, it does not hold on the stochastic model. However, subsection 5.5 shows that accumulating reserves is welfare improving.




Figure 3: Consolidated Government Equilibria




Figure 4: Two-Government-Entities Equilibria




Figure 5: Government Entities' Best Responses




Figure 6: Optimal Net Debt

5 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I present the quantitative analysis of the model. Subsection 5.1 describes the computation of the model. Subsection 5.2 presents the calibration. Subsection 5.3 presents key statistics in the data and in the model simulations. Subsection 5.4 inspects the mechanism of the model. Subsection 5.5 explores the welfare implications of the two-government-entities approach. Finally, Subsection 5.6 provides a implementable rule for reserves accumulation.²⁵

5.1 Computational Algorithm

The following algorithm is used to solve the model:

1. Start with a guess for the bond price schedule such that $q(s, B', A') = e^{-r^*}$ for all (s, B', A') .
2. Start with a guess for the central bank's repayment value such that $V_r^M(y, \kappa, B, A) = V_r^M(1, 0, B, A)$ for all (y, κ, B', A') , where $V_r^M(1, 0, B, A)$ is the value function that solves the central bank's recursive problem in the deterministic case.
3. Solve the recursive problem of the central bank in default using value function iteration, and get the policy function for reserves accumulation in default $\hat{A}_d(s, A)$.
4. Solve the fiscal authority's recursive problem and get policy functions for default choice and debt issuance, $\hat{D}(s, B, A)$ and $\hat{B}(s, B, A)$.
5. Solve the recursive problem of the central bank in repayment using value function iteration, and get the policy function for reserves accumulation in repayment $\hat{A}_r(s, B, A)$.
6. Repeat (2)-(6) until the guess converges to the central banks repayment value.
7. Estimate the bond price schedule using the probability of default as in [Arellano \(2008\)](#).
8. Repeat (2)-(7) until the guess converges to the bond price schedule.

²⁵This is work in progress.

5.2 Calibration

Functional Forms.—The utility function with constant relative risk aversion is given by

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{(1-\sigma)}}{1-\sigma},$$

with $\sigma \neq 1$, and I follow [Chatterjee and Eyingungor \(2012\)](#) by adopting the functional form for default costs given by

$$\phi(y) = \max\{0, d_0y + d_1y^2\}.$$

Parameter Values.—The model is solved numerically to evaluate its quantitative predictions regarding the level of international reserves, public debt, and sovereign spreads. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico from 1994 to 2017, a typical emerging economy with an independent central bank used commonly as a reference for studies on reserves accumulation.²⁶ A period in the model refers to a year. I choose a subset of parameter values (summarized in table 2) that can be directly pinned down from the data, and then I choose a second subset of parameter values (summarized in table 3) such that model simulations match key aspects of the data.

The risk aversion parameter value ($\sigma = 2$) is standard in quantitative business cycle and sovereign default studies. The international risk-free interest rate is set to match the average real interest rate for US Treasury Bills from 1980 to 2017, which is 1.1% ($r^* = 0.011$). I use spreads from the EMBI+ to parameterize the lenders' stochastic discount factor. I assume that a period with high risk aversion is one in which the global EMBI+ is one standard deviation above the median over the sample period.²⁷ With this procedure, I obtain 3 episodes of high risk premium every 20 years with an average duration equal to 1.25 years, which implies $\pi_{LH} = 0.15$ and $\pi_{HL} = 0.8$.²⁸ The parameter values that govern the endowment process are chosen to mimic the behavior of logged and linearly detrended GDP. The estimation of the stochastic process for the cyclical component of GDP yields $\rho = 0.66$ and $\eta = 0.034$. I set the reentry probability to match an average duration in financial exclusion of 9 years, which corresponds to the time period that Mexico was excluded

²⁶The time period starts in 1994 because the Mexican central bank independence reform was approved in 1993.

²⁷I use quarterly data from 1993 to 2017, excluding data for sovereign default episodes following [Catao and Mano \(2017\)](#).

²⁸The high risk premium episodes are observed in 1994-1995 (Tequila crisis), 1998 (Russian default), and 2008 (global financial crisis). On average, the global EMBI+ was 2 percentage points higher in those episodes than in normal periods.

from financial markets in its last default episode (1982-1990). This yields $\theta = 0.11$. Finally, the central bank's discount factor is disciplined by the average money market interest rate observed in Mexico during the period that the central bank has been independent. This is a real interest rate of 3.5%, which implies $\beta^M = 0.966$.

Table 2: Parameters Calibrated from the Data

Parameter	Description	Value	Source / Target
σ	Risk aversion	2	Alfaro and Kanczuk
r^*	International risk-free interest rate	0.011	US Treasury bills rate = 1.1%
π_{LH}	Probability of transiting to high risk premium	0.15	Global EMBI +
π_{HL}	Probability of transiting to low risk premium	0.80	Global EMBI +
ρ	Auto-correlation of y	0.66	Mexico's GDP
η	Variance of y	0.034	Mexico's GDP
θ	Reentry probability	0.11	9 years in default (1982-1990)
β^M	Central Bank's discount factor	0.966	MX money market rate = 3.5%

There are four parameters calibrated by simulation: the fiscal authority's discount factor β^F , the parameters associated to the exogenous default cost d_0 and d_1 , and the pricing kernel parameter κ_H . I choose these four parameters to match four targets in the data: (i) an average public debt of 44.4% of GDP, (ii) an average level of spreads of 267 basis points, (iii) an increase in the spread during high risk premium periods of 300 basis points, which is the average increase in the sovereign spread observed in Mexico during the three high risk premium episodes identified in the data, and (iv) a low correlation between total public debt and GDP. The fiscal authority's discount factor mainly determine the average debt level, the values of the default cost mainly determine the behavior of spreads, and the pricing kernel parameter is mainly disciplined by the correlation between debt and GDP.

I use total public debt data from IMF datasets. While this data includes domestically held and long-term debt, in the model all domestic bonds mature in one period and are held by foreigners.²⁹

²⁹Total public debt data also includes debt denominated in domestic and foreign currency, while the model implicitly

Since the model is not rich enough to consider many debt instruments, there is a trade-off when choosing the debt instrument that disciplines the model.³⁰ While there is no a perfect way to solve this trade-off, I choose to target total public debt because it is the most general instrument that approximates the behavior of the fiscal authority. Subsection 5.6 presents an alternative calibration where the fiscal authority’s discount factor is calibrated to match the debt service.

Table 3: Parameters Calibrated by Simulation

Parameter	Description	Value	Target
β^F	Fiscal Authority’s discount factor	0.946	Debt to GDP = 44.4%
d_0	Default cost parameter	-0.081	Average spread = 273 bp
d_1	Default cost parameter	0.902	Increase in spread = 300 bp
κ_H	Pricing kernel parameter	0.17	$\text{corr}(r_s, B/y) = -0.1$

5.3 Key Statistics: Model vs Data

Now, I report long-run moments in the data and in the model simulations.³¹ Table 4 shows that model simulations match the calibration targets. Table 5 shows that the model also does a good job in mimicking the behavior of reserves and debt. In particular, the two-government-entities approach rationalizes a reserves to GDP ratio of 7.2%, which corresponds to 83% of the average level of reserves observed in Mexico from 1994 to 2017 (8.7% of GDP). Moreover, the model matches a high and positive correlation between reserves and debt observed the data, as well as the pro-cyclical behavior of reserves. Most of these results are consistent with [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#). In contrast with their model, I do not consider long-term debt. By considering only one-period bonds, I abstract from the hedging motive against rollover risk and explore the conflict of interest among government entities as a mechanism for reserve accumulation.

assumes that the real exchange is equal to one so there is no distinction between domestic and foreign currency.

³⁰Currently, I am working on an extension of the two-government-entities approach by adding long-term debt as in [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#).

³¹Moments in the model are computed by generating 1,000 simulations samples of 500 periods each and taking the last 50 observations of samples in which the last default was observed at least 25 periods before the beginning of the sample.

The model also generates volatile spreads and a high correlation between consumption and income, which is consistent with previous studies that do not consider reserve accumulation such as [Aguiar and Gopinath \(2006\)](#), and [Arellano \(2008\)](#). The model generates a spread volatility that is higher than the observed in Mexico, but it is close to the median for emerging economies documented by [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#). Finally, the model underestimates the historical probability of default.³² However, the model was calibrated for the period where the central bank has been independent and there are not default episodes observed in this period.

Table 4: Targeted Moments

	Data	Model
mean B/y (%)	44.4	43.3
mean r_s (%)	2.7	2.7
$\Delta(r_s)$ for $\kappa = \kappa_H$ (%)	3.0	2.9
corr ($B/y, y$)	-0.1	0.0

Table 5: Non-targeted Moments

	Data	Model
mean (A/y) (%)	8.7	7.2
corr ($A/y, B/y$)	0.6	0.8
corr ($A/y, y$)	0.7	0.3
corr (c, y)	0.8	0.9
std (r_s) (%)	1.3	3.0
default prob (%)	3.0	0.9

³²According to [Catao and Mano \(2017\)](#), the Mexican government has defaulted on its debt 3 times in the last 100 years, which gives a rough estimate for the historical default probability of 3%.

5.4 Two-Government-Entities Approach

The accumulation of international reserves in the model is driven by the assumption of different discount factors, which leads to a disagreement between the central bank and the fiscal authority about household's intertemporal consumption. This disagreement can be illustrated by considering two different economies where reserves and debt are chosen by the same government entity. Let $\bar{A}^F(y, \kappa, B, A)$ and $\bar{B}^F(y, \kappa, B, A)$ denote policy functions for reserves and debt in an economy that is only populated by the fiscal authority (i.e. $\beta^F = \beta^M < \beta$), also called consolidated government economy. For a given aggregate state, the households' consumption can be expressed by rewriting the resource constraint (eq. 5),

$$\bar{c}^F(s, B, A) = y - B + A + q(y, \kappa, B', A')B' - q^*A', \quad (13)$$

where $B' = \bar{B}^F(y, \kappa, B, A)$ and $A' = \bar{A}^F(y, \kappa, B, A)$.

Now, I consider an economy where the benevolent central bank chooses reserves and debt ($\beta^F = \beta^M = \beta$). Let $\bar{A}^M(y, \kappa, B, A)$ and $\bar{B}^M(y, \kappa, B, A)$ denote policy functions for reserves and debt in such economy, also called the social planner economy. Analogously, households' consumption can be expressed as

$$\bar{c}^M(s, B, A) = y - B + A + q(y, \kappa, B', A')B' - q^*A', \quad (14)$$

where $B' = \bar{B}^M(y, \kappa, B, A)$ and $A' = \bar{A}^M(y, \kappa, B, A)$.

Figure 7 illustrates the disagreement among government entities by plotting policy functions for consumption for the consolidated economy and the social planner economy, $\bar{c}^F(s, B, A)$ and $\bar{c}^M(s, B, A)$ respectively. Panel (a) shows that, given the aggregate state, the fiscal authority would choose to deliver higher consumption to the households than what the central bank would choose. This disagreement among government entities is represented by the difference in consumption. Panel (b) illustrates that the disagreement about intertemporal consumption implies a conflict of interest about the net debt position of the economy, where the fiscal authority would choose to issue more debt than what is socially optimal. For this specific state, fiscal authority's over-borrowing is equivalent to the disagreement about intertemporal consumption and equal to 6% of GDP.

In the two-government-entities approach, fiscal authority and central bank not only disagree about the intertemporal consumption but also have different policy tools to affect the net debt of the economy. In particular, the fiscal authority could deliver higher consumption at period t by issuing debt and the central bank could deliver less consumption at t and higher consumption at $t + 1$ by accumulating reserves. Therefore, the benefit of accumulating reserves in the model depends on the central bank's ability to reduce the net debt position of the economy and affect the equilibrium consumption. To illustrate this point, it is convenient to see how consumption decreases when the central bank accumulates reserves

$$\frac{\partial \hat{c}(s, B, A)}{\partial A'} = -q^* + \frac{\partial q(s, \hat{B}(s, B, A), A')}{\partial A'} \hat{B}(s, B, A), \quad (15)$$

where the first term, $-q^*$, illustrates that to buy one risk-free asset the central bank has to pay q^* units of consumption today, and the second term represents that accumulating reserves also affects the units of consumption delivered to the households when the fiscal authority is issuing B' bonds. However, for any level of reserves, the fiscal authority can undo the effect of the accumulation of reserves by issuing more debt. This is

$$\frac{\partial \hat{c}(s, B, A)}{\partial B'} = q(s, B', A') + \frac{\partial q(s, B', \hat{A}_r(s, B, A))}{\partial B'} \hat{B}(s, B, A), \quad (16)$$

where the first term, $q(s, B', A')$, illustrates that by issuing debt the fiscal authority can deliver $q(s, B', A')$ units of consumption to the households plus the marginal effect of issuing one more bond on the price schedule, which is denoted by the second term.

Equations 15 and 16 illustrate that the interaction between the bond price schedule and the level of reserves and debt is crucial to understand the mechanism of the model. Figure 8a shows that the bond price schedule is decreasing in debt as in standard sovereign default models, but it is almost constant on the accumulation of international reserves. This result holds because, in contrast to debt levels, the reserves level affects both the default value and the repayment value for the fiscal authority. Therefore, a change in the level of reserves does not change substantially the incentives to default for the fiscal authority, thus the bond price schedule is almost flat on the accumulation of reserves. Figure 8b shows that both default and repayment values increase on the level of reserves, almost at the same rate, without changing the default incentives for the fiscal authority.

To show that sovereign risk is crucial to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing, suppose that there is no default risk. Therefore, the price of domestic bonds is equal to the price of foreign bonds for any aggregate state, $q(s, B', A') = q^*$, and neither reserves nor debt affect the bond prices. This is

$$\frac{\partial q(s, \hat{B}(s, B, A), A')}{\partial A'} = \frac{\partial q(s, B', \hat{A}_r(s, B, A))}{\partial B'} = 0,$$


which implies that by issuing one more bond the fiscal authority delivers q^* units of consumption and, vice versa, the central bank transfers one unit of consumption from today to tomorrow by buying one bond at price q^* . This is,

$$\left| \frac{\partial \hat{c}(s, B, A)}{\partial A'} \right| = \left| \frac{\partial \hat{c}(s, B, A)}{\partial B'} \right| = q^*.$$


Therefore, the spread on interest rates, $r_s = \frac{1}{q} - \frac{1}{q^*}$, is key to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing because it increases the cost of holding portfolios with high levels of reserves and debt.

Figure 9 shows the combinations of reserves and debt levels that would deliver the same level of consumption as in equilibrium. Solid dots represent choices of reserves and debt in equilibrium, $(\hat{A}_r(s, B, A), \hat{B}(s, B, A))$, given the aggregate state (s, B, A) . Panel (a) illustrates that for any level of reserves, the fiscal authority can issue more debt to undo the effect of the central bank's choice on the net debt position, and vice versa, the central bank can accumulate reserves to undo fiscal authority's over-borrowing. This figure also illustrates that the fiscal authority issues more debt in periods of high income than in low income periods, and the central bank accumulates more reserves in high income periods than in low income periods. The pro-cyclical behavior of debt is a common feature of sovereign default models, while the pro-cyclical behavior of reserves follows from the fact that the central bank accumulates more reserves to undo fiscal authority's over-borrowing. Panel (b) shows that the spread on interest rates is increasing in portfolios with higher levels of reserves and debt, which increases the cost of reversing the effect of the central bank's choice on the equilibrium consumption.

In a nutshell, the central bank's ability to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing depends on the sovereign spreads faced by the economy. The fiscal authority could undo central bank's purchases for any level of reserves but does not want to because it does perceive that spreads are going up and this is costly for the economy.




(a) Difference in Consumption




(b) Difference in Net Debt

Figure 7: Conflict of Interest among Government Entities




(a) Bond Price Schedule




(b) Fiscal Authority's Value Function

Figure 8: International Reserves and Sovereign Risk



(a) Portfolios of Reserves and Debt



(b) Cost of Accumulating Reserves

Figure 9: Reserves and Debt Choices in the Two-Government-Entities Approach

5.5 Welfare Analysis

Now, I explore the question of whether accumulating reserves is welfare improving. On one hand, the central bank accumulates reserves to undo fiscal authority's over-borrowing. On the other hand, this is costly because using reserves to pay back debt reduces sovereign spreads. To quantify the welfare gains of accumulating reserves, I contrast the two-government-entities approach with a consolidated government economy. Table 6 shows that, when the central bank is as impatient as the fiscal authority (i.e. not independent central bank), the model is consistent with [Alfaro and Kanczuk \(2009\)](#).

Table 6: Two-Government-Entities vs Consolidated Government

	Two-Gov-Ent	Consolidated
mean B/y (%)	43.3	39.4
mean A/y (%)	7.2	0.0
net debt position (%)	36.1	39.4
change in welfare (%)	0.1	0.0

To calculate the welfare gains of having an independent central bank that accumulates reserves, I proceed as follows. First, I take as a starting point a draw from the ergodic distribution of the consolidated government economy (y, κ, B, A) . Then, I simulate a series of shocks $\{(y, \kappa)\}_{t=1}^T$ for $T = 1000$. Using policy functions for the consolidated government economy and the two-government-entities approach, I compute the consumption path for both economies $\{(c_t^{NoInd}, c_t^{Indep})\}_{t=1}^T$. Then, I take $N = 1000$ draws of these consumption paths $C = \{ \{ (c_t^{NoInd}, c_t^{Indep}) \}_{t=1}^T \}_{n=1}^N$ and define:

$$V_{Indep}(C) = E \left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u(c_t^{Indep}) \right] \approx \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \beta^{t-1} u(c_{t,n}^{Indep})$$

and

$$V_{NoInd}(C, \lambda) = E \left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} u((1 + \lambda)c_t^{NoInd}) \right] \approx \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \beta^{t-1} u((1 + \lambda)c_{t,n}^{NoInd}),$$

where V_{Indep} is the value of having an independent central bank who accumulates reserves, V_{NoInd} is the value of having a consolidated government who controls choices of reserves and debt, and λ denotes a compensation to the households in the economy that does not have an independent central bank. I define welfare gains λ^* as the compensation such that households are indifferent between having and not having an independent central bank, $V_{Indep}(C) = V_{NoInd}(C, \lambda^*)$. By substituting the functional form for the utility function, we get

$$\lambda^* = \left(\frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \beta^{t-1} (c_{t,n}^{Indep})^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \beta^{t-1} (c_{t,n}^{NoInd})^{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} - 1.$$

By following this procedure, I estimate $\lambda^* = 0.0008$. Thus, having an independent central bank that accumulates reserves to discipline fiscal authority's over-borrowing increases social welfare by 0.1%. Figure 10 illustrates where are the welfare gains coming from. Panel (a) illustrates that by accumulating reserves, the central bank reduces the net debt position by 3.3% of GDP. Panel (b) shows that the borrowing cost, defined as the net debt position multiplied by the spread on interest rates, $r_s N$, goes down when the central bank is independent.




Figure 10: Welfare Gains

6 Conclusion

This paper studies the joint accumulation of international reserves and public debt in a sovereign default model with an independent central bank. I introduce central bank independence into the model by assuming an impatient fiscal authority and a benevolent central bank. This assumption leads to a conflict of interest among government entities that, in equilibrium, rationalizes positive levels of reserves and debt.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new channel for reserve accumulation. I find that accumulating reserves has the benefit of disciplining over-borrowing by the fiscal authority. Model simulations account for 83% of the average level of reserves observed in Mexico from 1994 to 2017. I estimate that having an independent central bank increases social welfare by 0.1%. Welfare gains come from reducing over-borrowing by 3.3% of GDP.

A policy implication of the two-government-entities approach is to provide an implementable rule for reserve accumulation. In practice, independence is often limited and central banks face political pressures to use the reserves. Implementing the reserve accumulation rule implied by the model not only insulate the reserve accumulation policy from political pressures but also mimics the optimal behavior of an independent central bank.

Overall, this paper provides a tractable model of sovereign default that could be used to study other reserve accumulation motives in the literature without assuming coordination between central bank and fiscal authority. An interesting avenue for future research is to introduce the hedging motive in [Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez \(2018\)](#), and further study the variance decomposition of the levels of reserves.

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